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To understand the narrow scope of Seth Barrett Tillman’s critique of my
article,1 The Garland Nomination, the Senate’s Duty, and the Surprising Lessons of
Constitutional Text,2 the reader must understand the scale of my thesis.
Therein, I analyze whether the Senate has a constitutional duty to
meaningfully consider presidential nominees to the United States Supreme
Court. To gain analytical traction on that problem, I identify those powers
the 114th Senate secured over the appointment process when it asserted the
authority to refuse consideration:
[T]he Senate . . . [expressly] claimed authority under the Appointments
Clause to decline consideration of any nominee of an individual President
based on factors such as (1) the Senate’s perception of the importance of the
appointment or (2) the political features of its timing. A Senate that claims
those powers captures the authority to indefinitely halt the appointment
process, to shift the appointment power to a subsequent President, and even
to unilaterally reduce the size of the Court upon the emergence of a vacancy.
Moreover, a Senate that claims the threshold power to decide who will be
considered functionally usurps part of the President’s nomination power
itself.3

I then review the controlling constitutional text to evaluate the legitimacy of
those claims.4 I conduct that review in conformity with traditional canons
for understanding text, frequently using Justice Scalia’s own definitive
treatise as a guide.5 And, I conclude that the text of the Appointments
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Clause, and the purposes conveyed by that language, cannot be harmonized
with the Senate’s express and implicit claims of authority.6
I provide five reasons why the Senate’s claim of authority defies the
Constitution’s distribution of powers between the branches:
[T]he 114th Senate’s misreading of its textual authority under the Advice
and Consent Clause: (1) compromises the President’s exclusive power to
select nominees; (2) contradicts the evident purpose of the Appointments
Clause as conveyed by its text (the mandatory and prompt appointment of
important governmental functionaries); (3) bypasses the Constitution’s
express prescription for how the size of the Court may be altered; (4)
overlooks constitutional limitations on the Senate’s rule-making authority;
and (5) cripples one of the intended constitutional checks on the Senate’s
power over the appointment process.7

I also observe more generally that the Framers’ placement of the
Appointments Clause in Article II, Section 2 (rather than in Article I or, more
neutrally, in Article III), coupled with the sparse and dependent language of
the Advice and Consent Clause, contradicts any textual claim that the Senate
was tacitly endowed with dominant authority over the appointments
process.8 Finally, I review founding-era understandings of the Appointments
Clause held by the Constitution’s most prominent drafters, explicators, and
opponents.9 That inquiry corroborates my thesis that the Appointments
Clause was designed to provide the President, not the Senate, primary and
dominant authority over the appointments process.
Mr. Tillman takes issue with but one of those arguments, an argument
neither original to my article nor necessary to accept my thesis: I contend,
inter alia, that the text of the Appointments Clause sets forth a three-step
process for filling important government posts: nomination, Senate
consideration (through advice and consent), and appointment.10 The first
and third of those steps are expressly obligatory: the President “shall
nominate” and “shall appoint.”11 For this reason, I posit that the second
step—Senate consideration—must be implicitly mandatory as well.12 That
argument is anchored in the semantic meaning of the word “shall,”
supported by the context of that word’s usage elsewhere in Article II.13
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Mr. Tillman first wages a jurisprudential challenge. Tillman finds
reasoning by Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison that, he maintains,
contradicts the notion that the Appointments Clause creates any obligation
on the President to fill vacancies.14 Although Tillman chides my thesis for
overlooking such a prominent case,15 Tillman himself overlooks the plain
context of Justice Marshall’s reasoning. In the segments quoted by Tillman,
Marshall analyzes whether a person who has been lawfully nominated and
appointed by the President for a lesser governmental post, but has not
received his commission from the Secretary of State, has been lawfully
installed in that position.16
To address that question, Marshall compares those Article II
appointment powers the President enjoys independent from congressional
influence to those that the President must execute in compliance with
congressional directive.17 To this end, Marshall identifies a distinction
between those officials the President has the exclusive power to nominate and
appoint without any congressional delegation of appointment authority
(those officials specifically itemized in the Appointments Clause), and those
“inferior officers” as to whom Congress maintains authority to specify the
appointing entity.18 Marshall makes this distinction to evaluate whether, and
under what circumstances, a President has an Article II, Section 3 duty to
“commission all the officers of the United States.”19
In context, then, when Marshall states that the President’s power to
nominate is “the sole act of the President” and “completely voluntary,”20 he
is addressing not whether the constitutional text obligates the President to fill
the itemized important governmental posts (an issue not before the Court in
Marbury), but rather whether the President has the exclusive power to
nominate independent of any congressional role. Notably, in the next
sentence, when Marshall similarly describes the President’s appointment
power itself as an exclusive, voluntary act, he qualifies that “it can only be
performed by and with the advice and consent of the senate.”21
To put it bluntly, Marshall does not purport to address the question
relevant to my thesis: whether the semantically mandatory language of
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Article II, Section 2 imposes an express duty on the President, and an implied
duty on the Senate, to take the actions necessary to fill important
governmental vacancies. This explains why those constitutional scholars,
who previously made the same point as mine, did not address Marshall’s
reasoning.22
Mr. Tillman also makes a more pertinent and sophisticated argument
that the meaning of the word “shall” in the Appointments Clause is unclear.23
But he fails to rebut the most powerful evidence demonstrating the drafters’
semantic intentions. As I explain, Article II, Section 2 calibrates the level of
presidential discretion attached to each of the numerous executive powers
itemized therein.24 Thus, one must overlook the structure and context of the
language immediately surrounding the Appointments Clause to contend that
the Framers used “shall” casually or imprecisely therein. Indeed, elsewhere
in Article II, the drafters demonstrated themselves capable of using the word
“will” to denote an expectation of future action and “may” to indicate
discretionary action.25
Mr. Tillman’s challenge to my thesis—wherein he maintains that
intellectual integrity requires that I respond to his above critiques—invites a
challenge to his own. Those who, like Tillman, (1) maintain that Originalism
transcends other forms of constitutional and textual interpretation in assuring
fidelity to the rule of law,26 (2) laud Justice Scalia as the most articulate and
powerful advocate of that view, and (3) recognize that Justice Scalia’s
replacement would determine the mode of interpretation embraced by the
majority of the Supreme Court for a generation, must also answer some
questions.
In refusing to allow a validly elected President to fill Justice Scalia’s
vacancy on the Supreme Court, did the 114th Senate make any serious effort
to abide by the textualist and originalist principles of constitutional
interpretation for which it had eulogized Justice Scalia?27 When that
Senate’s leadership claimed broad authority to dominate the appointments
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process, did it conduct any searching analysis of Article II, Section 2 to find
even a scrap of express language affirmatively supporting its unprecedented
assertion of power? Conversely, did the Senate consider whether that novel
claim of authority could be harmonized with the express text of the
Appointments Clause and the evident purposes of that text?28
My thesis makes a comprehensive case from the text of Article II,
reinforced by founding-era understandings of that text, that the 114th Senate
violated constitutional design when it refused to consider any person
nominated by President Obama to replace Justice Scalia. My thesis suggests
that a Senate majority, which praised Justice Scalia for his commitment to
abide by constitutional text, elevated partisan political goals over any
conscientious effort to comply with the express and implicit constitutional
directive found in the Appointments Clause. Given the gravity of that
conclusion to a core originalist claim—that their professed theory of
interpretation most effectively constrains politically motivated constructions
of the law—Mr. Tillman’s one-issue response to my multi-faceted thesis is
strikingly incomplete.
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